Appellants challenged the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which found them guilty of murder and kidnapping, claiming that the trial court erred in conducting a joint trial, in violation of their right of confrontation, U.S. Const. amend. VI, and limiting cross-examination of each other.
Victim movie producer contacted one of appellants about producing a movie. That appellant conspired with the other appellants to kidnap and kill the victim, Los Angeles ADA attorney after he allegedly stole money and cocaine. Two appellants forcibly took the victim out to the desert, where they shot him. After the victim was discovered, appellants were charged and convicted of murder and kidnapping. Appellants challenged their conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in not conducting separate trials, and deciding that evidence under declarations against interest, may be received in a joint trial without denying the other appellants the right of confrontation guaranteed by the U.S. Const. amend. VI. The court held that the standard of review was abuse of discretion, and that the trial court did not err in conducting one trial for all appellants. The court stated that the trial court properly limited cross-examination between appellants, and that hearsay statements were admissible as declaration against interest, as each appellant was implicated as well as each other. The court affirmed the convictions, and overruled the points of error.
The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and held that appellants were properly tried for murder and kidnapping; that they were not entitled to separate trials. The trial court correctly limited cross-examination of each other, and that hearsay statements of illegal activity were properly admitted under the declaration against interest exception.
Appellant sought review from the Superior Court of Alameda County (California), where he was sentenced to death after being convicted of first degree murder with special circumstance in that the victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed to prevent her testimony. Appellant’s motion for new trial and automatic application for modification of the verdict were denied, and appellant then raised several issues on appeal.
Appellant was charged with murdering a woman to prevent her from testifying in a criminal proceeding that had been brought against him for raping her. Appellant was sentenced to death after being convicted of the murder with a special circumstance and filed motions for new trial and automatic application for modification, which were denied. Appellant sought review and asserted numerous issues regarding jury instructions, evidentiary issues regarding testimony and admission of criminal history, and guilt and penalty phase errors. On appeal, the court found that any jury instruction error was harmless. The court found that appellant’s criminal history was properly admitted in the context in which it was presented. Evidence that the victim expressed fear of appellant was corroborative of other testimony. There was no prejudice from the trial court’s failure to admonish jurors. As to the penalty phase, the court found that the jury was not misled into treating the mere absence of any mitigating factor as an aggravating factor. The court found no error in the admission of other crimes shown as an aggravating factor. The judgment was affirmed accordingly.
The court affirmed the conviction of murder and the special circumstance finding and found no error in the penalty trial which imposed the death penalty upon defendant. The court did find that the trial judge should have stated reasons for his findings relative to the automatic application for modification of the penalty verdict, however, that omission did not require reversal or remand.
*
Be the first to comment.